Insurance Coverage - State Farm Prevails Because Policyholders No Longer Live In Residence

SCHUCHMAN v. STATE AUTO PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Dist. Court, SD Illinois 2012 - Google Scholar:

State Farm has won summary judgment in a coverage case.  The plaintiffs purchased homeowners insurance and then made the mistake of moving out to a mobile home.  The residence sustained fire damage and they submitted a claim to State Farm, which denied coverage.

The District Court agreed with State Farm and granted summary judgment.  Because the insurance contract limited State Farm's obligation to insure a "residence," plaintiff's had no claim.

This type of result occurs all the time in the world of insurance coverage - plaintiff buys insurance only to realize that when there is a claim, he has no insurance.

Edward X. Clinton, Jr.


'via Blog this'

Read More

Insured Prevails In Coverage Fight With Progressive Insurance

PROGRESSIVE DIRECT INSURANCE COMPANY v. JUNGKANS, Ill: Appellate Court, 2nd Dist. 2012 - Google Scholar:

This case was recently decided by the Illinois Appellate Court, Second District.

The defendant, Kyle Jungkans, was seriously injured in a motor vehicle accident, while he was riding in a car driven by Billy Watts.

Jungkans settled with State Farm, Watts' insurer, for the policy limits, then sought underinsured motorist coverage under his policy with Progressive Direct.  Progressive denied coverage on the basis that Jungkans' failure to give notice to Progressive before the settlement violated the cooperation clause.  The trial court granted Progressive summary judgment, but the Appellate Court reversed.

Jungkans conceded that he violated the Progressive policy by failing to give notice to Progressive.  However, Progressive was not prejudiced by the settlement because Watts was judgment proof at the time of the accident.  Moreover, Progressive was aware of its subrogation rights before Jungkans entered into the settlement with State Farm.

The Court explains:

As to the knowledge issue:

"¶ 19 We agree with defendant that there is no genuine dispute that State Farm knew in advance of the settlement that plaintiff had a subrogation right against Watts and that this was sufficient to defeat the invocation of the cooperation clause. Bell said plainly that she knew in advance of plaintiff's subrogation right. Although this statement was a conclusion, it hardly required elaboration; Bell would have known whether she had been aware of plaintiff's subrogation right, a routine fact of insurance litigation. Under the case law, that was sufficient. Thus, there is no genuine issue of fact as to whether plaintiff retained its subrogation right, especially as, per Richter, it was ultimately plaintiff's burden to prove that defendant's settlement cut off that right."


As to the prejudice issue, there was no prejudice because the defendant in the underlying case was judgment proof.


"¶ 25 Numerous jurisdictions have held that an insurer may not rely on a technical violation of a cooperation clause to deny coverage if the tortfeasor with whom the insured settled was judgment-proof."


The opinion cites the many cases siding with the insured.


Edward X. Clinton, Jr.


www.clintonlaw.net



'via Blog this'

Read More

Contract Law - Personal Guaranty Enforced in Illinois

The case is a routine collection case for $5,000.  The legal issue is important: the enforceability of a personal guaranty.

TH Davidson and Company v. Eidola Concrete, LLC and Thomas E. Kilbride, 2012 Il App (3d) 110641.

The case originated in small claims court.  Plaintiff sought to recover on a line of credit for $5,600.80.  The trial court entered judgement in that amount against Plaintiff, and against Kilbride, who signed a personal guaranty.

Kilbride appealed on the ground that his guaranty was limited to $1,000.  He based this argument on the original credit application, which he signed as a personal guarantor.  The original credit application was for $1,000.  Later, the parties, through a course of dealing, increased the credit limit to $5,600.

The trial court and the appellate court found that the guaranty was a continuing guaranty.  The opinion at Paragraph 11 quotes the Restatement (Third) of Suretyship and Guaranty § 16: "A continuing guaranty is a contract pursuant to which a person agrees to be a secondary obligor for all future obligations fo the principal obligor to the obligee."  Because the parties contemplated a "future course of dealing" the guaranty was for the maximum amount of credit extended.

Kilbride could have also limited the guaranty by inserting express language into the credit application.  He did not.  Therefore, the guaranty was unlimited.

Comment: clients should never sign a continuing guaranty.  Limiting language should always be inserted.  That being said, my experience is that clients sign these documents all the time and do not consider the consequences until it is too late.

Edward X. Clinton, Jr.

www.clintonlaw.net

Read More