Plaintiff Loses Contract Claim Due To Quirks of Uniform Commercial Code

KJAER v. Village of Bensenville, Ill: Appellate Court, 2nd Dist. 2012 - Google Scholar:

The Uniform Commercial Code contains many statute of limitations provisions.  If the underlying transaction involved a sale of goods, the plaintiff has four years to sue.  If the transaction was one for "services," the plaintiff has 10 years to sue.

The UCC provisions are different than the Illinois statute of limitations which gives a plaintiff five years to sue on an oral contract and 10 to sue on a written contract.

Here the plaintiff sold radar and noise monitoring systems to the defendant and was not paid for six years. The trial court and the appellate court agreed that it was primarily a sale of goods not services and the claim was barred.

The court explains the inquiry as follows:

"16 This appeal concerns whether section 2-725 of the UCC or section 13-206 of theCode should apply to the subject matter of the agreement between the parties. Article 2 of the UCC applies only to transactions in "goods" (Nitrin, Inc. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.,35 Ill. App. 3d 577, 592 (1976)), and "goods" are defined as "all things, including specially manufactured goods, which are movable at the time of identification to the contract for sale" (810 ILCS 5/2-105(1) (West 2010)). A contract for services is not a transaction in goods and is not covered by Article 2 of the UCC. Boddie v. Litton Unit Handling Systems, 118 Ill. App. 3d 520, 531 (1983). Where a contract mixes the sale of goods and the provision of services, the applicability of Article 2 of the UCC is determined by the "`predominant purpose'" test. Brandt v. Boston Scientific Corp., 204 Ill. 2d 640, 645 (2003). Under this test, if the contract is predominantly for goods and only incidentally for services, Article 2 of the UCC will apply. Brandt, 204 Ill. 2d at 645. If the contract is predominantly for services and only incidentally for goods, Article 2 of the UCC will not apply. Zielinski v. Miller, 277 Ill. App. 3d 735, 741 (1995). Further, the determination of the predominant purpose of a contract is usually a question of fact.Heuerman v. B&M Construction, Inc., 358 Ill. App. 3d 1157, 1165 (2005). Nevertheless, the predominant purpose of a contract is also susceptible to determination as a matter of law. Brandt, 204 Ill. 2d at 647-48."

Comment: the lesson is to check the Uniform Commercial Code before filing suit.  If there is doubt, file the case.

Edward X. Clinton, Jr.

www.clintonlaw.net

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UCC Statute Of Limitations is Not Subject To Discovery Rule

Hawkins v. NALICK, Ill: Appellate Court, 5th Dist. 2012 - Google Scholar:

The Uniform Commercial Code (enacted in every state, including Illinois) has a three-year statute of limitations.

This case is a bad check case.  The plaintiff sued her former lawyer and a bank when the lawyer allegedly forged her signature on a check and converted her money.  The defendant bank argued that the case was filed after the three-year period and thus should be dismissed.  The trial court agreed and dismissed the case.

On appeal, Hawkins argued that the claim did not accrue until she discovered it and, therefore, her lawsuit was timely.

First, the legal standard for holding the bank liable for wrongfully cashing a check:

"Section 3-420(a) of the UCC provides in relevant part: "An instrument is *** converted if it is taken by transfer, other than a negotiation, from a person not entitled to enforce the instrument or a bank makes or obtains payment with respect to the instrument for a person not entitled to enforce the instrument or receive payment." 810 ILCS 5/3-420(a) (West 2010). "To establish that a financial institution is liable for conversion under Illinois law, the plaintiff must establish (1) that she owned, held an interest in, or had the right to possess a negotiable instrument; (2) that someone forged or without authority placed the plaintiff's endorsement on the instrument; and (3) that the defendant financial institution negotiated the check without her authorization." Rodrigue v. Olin Employees Credit Union, 406 F.3d 434, 439 (7th Cir. 2005)."

Second, the appellate court concluded that the result, while it was harsh, was in accordance with the majority of jurisdictions that have ruled on this issue. The court explained:

"As noted above, almost every jurisdiction that has addressed this issue has held that the discovery rule does not apply to the UCC's three-year statute of limitations on claims for the conversion of negotiable instruments. See Estate of Hollywood v. First National Bank of Palmerton, 2004 PA Super 321, ¶ 20 (and cases cited therein). Accordingly, we are compelled to adopt the majority view and hold that the discovery rule does not toll the running of the three-year statute of limitations set forth in section 3-118(g) of the UCC.

¶ 26 In the present case, there is no evidence that the plaintiff could have known that Nalick converted her inheritance check from her mother's estate. Unlike the plaintiffs in Haddad's of Illinois and Kidney Cancer Ass'n, there is no indication that the plaintiff in the present case was in the best position to easily and quickly detect the loss and take appropriate action or that she could have detected the conversion sooner with adequate bookkeeping. Nonetheless, we believe that we must apply the three-year statute of limitations on claims for the conversion of negotiable instruments.

¶ 27 "The rationale most often cited in support of the majority perspective is that application of the discovery rule would be inimical to the underlying purposes of the UCC, including the goals of certainty of liability, finality, predictability, uniformity, and efficiency in commercial transactions." Rodrigue, 406 F.3d at 445-46. Application of the discovery rule to a cause of action for the conversion of a negotiable instrument undermines the underlying goals of the UCC. Id. Although the mechanical application of the statute of limitations in the present case leads to a harsh result, courts addressing this issue have noted that greater good is served by the strict application of the limitations period. Menichini v. Grant, 995 F.2d 1224, 1230 (3d Cir. 1993); Husker News Co. v. Mahaska State Bank, 460 N.W.2d 476, 479 (Iowa 1990) ("Strict application of the limitation period, while predictably harsh in some cases, best serves the twin goals of swift resolution of controversies and `certainty of liability' advanced by the U.C.C.")."

The problem with the discovery rule is that the rule leaves the statute of limitations open ended.  Plaintiff can sue whenever the conversion is discovered.  This is bad for banks and increases transaction costs because the bank may have to evaluate a transaction years after the fact.  The other rationale against using the discovery rule is that the plaintiff is usually in the best position to know that there was a conversion.  Most people would, in theory, notice that a large check was missing and take some action.  Here, the missing check was not discovered because the lawyer lied to the client.

Comment: this is a thoughtful well-researched opinion that lays out both sides of the issue and explains why the court chose the path that it chose.  The court checked the law of other jurisdictions and reviewed the policy reasons in favor of a hard and fast three-year statute of limitations.

Edward X. Clinton, Jr.

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What Is a Security Under the Federal Securities Laws?

One of the most challenging questions in the securities laws is whether a particular interest or contract is a security. If the contract is not a security, the federal Securities Laws do not apply and the promoter does not have to register the investment. If it is a security, the investment must be registered. Thus, whether something is a security is litigated often. There is no definitive answer to the question. The main issue is whether the investor is relying on the efforts of others to earn a return or profit. An investor in a blue chip company purchases a share of stock and hopes to earn a return based on the work of the company and its employees. The question in analyzing an investment contract is whether the holder of the contract is trying to profit from the work of other people or not.

The term "Security" means:

"any note, stock, treasury stock, security future, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege on any security, certificate of deposit, or group or index of securities (including any interest therein or based on the value thereof), or any put, call straddle, option, or privilege entered into on a national securities exchange relating to foreign currency, or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a security, or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing." 15 U.S.C. §77b(a)(1).

The importance of the definition of security becomes apparent in the area of private actions for securities fraud because the standard for establishing securities fraud is much lower than that for common law fraud.

The Supreme Court has adopted a flexible and liberal approach in determining what constitutes a security. In its famous decision of SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 90 L.Ed. 1244, 66 S.Ct. 1100 (1946), the Court held that land sales contracts for citrus groves in Florida, coupled with warranty deeds for the land and a contract to service the land, were investment contracts and thus securities. The Court stated that:

[a]n investment contract for purposes of the Securities Act means a contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his money in a common enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party. 66 S.Ct. at 1103.

According to the Court, it is immaterial whether the shares in the enterprise are evidenced by formal certificates or by nominal interests in the physical assets employed in the enterprise. 66 S.Ct. at 1104. The Howey investment contract analysis has been the starting point in determining the status of transactions in the securities area. In applying this analysis, courts have traditionally looked to the substance of the transaction to decide whether a security is involved and have made the determination regardless of the label placed on the interest by the parties to the transaction. Courts have found that countless schemes designed to produce profits for the participants, such as the sale of franchises, fur-bearing animals, and shares in fishing boats and cemetery lots, were covered by the 1933 Act. See 2 Louis Loss and Joel Seligman, SECURITIES REGULATION, pp. 948 – 956 (3d ed. 1989); Carl W. Schneider, The Elusive Definition of a Security — An Examination of the Investment Contract Concept and the Propriety of a Risk Capital Analysis Under Federal Law, 12 Tex.Tech.L.Rev. 911 (1981).

One significant question is whether an interest in a limited liability company is a security. In Robinson v. Glynn, 349 F.3d 166 (4th Cir. 2003), the Fourth Circuit held that an interest in an LLC is not a security. The Fourth Circuit held that the plaintiff investor was not seeking to profit ―solely from the efforts of others. The court claimed that he had significant control over the company, including the right to appoint two board members. However, in SEC v. Merchant Capital, 483 F.3d 747 (11th Cir. 2007), the Court held that interests in limited liability partnerships were investment contracts‖ under Howey. Also, see United States v. Leonard, 529 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2008) (affirming criminal convictions for violating the securities laws and holding that interests in an LLC sold by Defendants were securities under the Howey investment contract test.).

As the Leonard court noted, an LLC requires a case by case analysis to determine whether the purchaser had significant control over the operations of the company. 529 F.3d. at 89.
In SEC v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389, 157 L.Ed.2d 813, 124 S.Ct. 892 (2004), the Supreme Court reaffirmed the validity of Howey, supra. In Edwards, the defendant controlled ETS Payphones, Inc., which sold payphones to the public. The payphones were sold under a sale and leaseback agreement, under which the investor would ―purchase the payphone and then lease it back to ETS in exchange for a payment of $82 each month. For each investor, the $82 payment represented a 14-percent return on the investment. After ETS filed for bankruptcy protection, the SEC filed a civil enforcement action against Edwards, alleging that he had violated the registration requirements of 15 U.S.C. §§77e(a) and 77e(c). The Eleventh Circuit in SEC v. ETS Payphones, Inc., 300 F.3d 1281 (11th Cir. 2002), held that the sale and leaseback scheme was not a ―security because it offered a fixed rate of return. The Eleventh Circuit also held that the Howey test ―that the return on the investment be derived solely from the efforts of others‘ did not apply because the investor had a contractual right to the $82 payment each month. 124 S.Ct. at 896, quoting ETS Payphones, supra, 300 F.3d at 1285. Thus, in the Edwards case, the Supreme Court reaffirmed Howey and held that an investment scheme promising a fixed rate of return can be an 'investment contract‘ and thus a 'security‘ subject to the federal securities laws. 124 S.Ct. at 898 – 899.

Some items that give their holders a right of use do not constitute securities. In United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 44 L.Ed.2d 621, 95 S.Ct. 2051 (1975), the Supreme Court found that ―stock‖ entitling its holder to purchase an apartment from a cooperative was not a security because the purchasers were acquiring a right to purchase an apartment. The purchasers were not seeking the benefits accruing to investors. Rather, they were seeking the use of an apartment.

Ordinary commercial paper, even when described as a ―note, is not a security. In C.N.S. Enterprises, Inc. v. G. and G. Enterprises, Inc., 508 F.2d 1354 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 96 S.Ct. 38 (1975), the court held that certain notes were not securities because the notes were ordinary commercial paper. The bank holding the notes was not acting as an investor or business partner. See also American Fletcher Mortgage Co. v. U.S. Steel Credit Corp., 635 F.2d 1247 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S.Ct. 1982 (1981).

Bank certificates of deposit are not securities. Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 71 L.Ed.2d 409, 102 S.Ct. 1220 (1982). In the Court‘s view, because the banking laws amply protect investors in bank CDs, it is unnecessary to subject the issuer banks to liability under the antifraud provisions of the securities laws.

The sale of 100 percent of the outstanding stock of a company involves the sale of a security. Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 85 L.Ed.2d 692, 105 S.Ct. 2297 (1985). In so holding, the Supreme Court expressed its view that the instrument involved was stock under the plain language of the statute.

A real estate contract may also be a security. In Adams v. Cavanagh Communities Corp., 847 F.Supp. 1390 (N.D.Ill. 1994), investors who had purchased Florida real estate interests on land sales contracts sued the developers for securities fraud. The court held that the land sales agreements were investment contracts. Moreover, since the installment contracts called for a repeated series of decisions to invest, each term payment was a separate offer and sale for determining the statute of limitations. Other courts have held that mortgage participations (Pollack v. Laidlaw Holdings, Inc., 27 F.3d 808 (2d Cir. 1994)) and joint venture interests purchased in reliance on the expertise of the venture‘s managers to generate profits (Stone v. Kirk, 8 F.3d 1079 (6th Cir. 1993)) are securities.

Comment:

This is a short summary of some of the cases discussing the investment contract test. It is meant to give the reader a basic idea of how the test operates.

Whether a contract or other economic right is a security essentially depends on whether the holder of the contract is acting as an investor who seeks financial benefits based on the work of a promoter or a third party.

The practicing lawyer should remember that the statute makes it clear that a promissory note or share of stock in a small closely held corporation is a security. 15 U.S.C. §77b(a)(1).

Edward X. Clinton, Jr.

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District Court Holds That Moorman Doctrine Bars A Conversion Claim

Lansing v. Carroll, Dist. Court, ND Illinois 2012 - Google Scholar:

The economic loss or Moorman doctrine bars tort claims where the damages are purely economic.    Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Nat'l Tank Co., 435 N.E.2d 443, 453, 91 Ill. 2d 69, 61 Ill. Dec. 746 (Ill. 1982); Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. SEC Donohue, Inc., 679 N.E.2d 1197, 1199, 176 Ill. 2d 160, 223 Ill. Dec. 424 (Ill. 1997).

In this case a dispute arose concerning the provisions of a buy-sell agreement.  The plaintiff brought a conversion claim.  Because the conversion claim sought contract damages, it was barred by the Moorman doctrine. The court concluded that the plaintiff's conversion claim was really a breach of contract claim accompanied by the words "willful" and "wanton."

Moorman often swallows up tort claims in business litigation where the parties also have a contract.  The purpose of Moorman is to prevent clever lawyers from turning every breach of contract into a tort.  Interpreting Moorman is one of the main issues facing business litigators today.

Edward X. Clinton, Jr.

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Corporate Law - Piercing the Corporate Veil - Fontana v. TLD Builders, Inc., 362 Ill. App. 3d 491 (Ill. App. 2nd Dist. 2005)

Fontana v. TLD Builders 362 Ill. App. 3d 491 (Ill. App. 2d Dist 2005).

This is probably the most famous piercing the veil case in Illinois because it pierced the corporate veil and held liable a non-shareholder of the corporation. The result is counter-intuitive, but, is understandable when one considers the underlying facts of the case.

The Fontanas alleged that they entered into a contract with TLD under which TLD agreed to construct a single family home in Clarendon Hills for the sum of $1,475,800.

The Fontanas alleged that TLD breached the contract by failing to construct the home as specified in the contract and "by abandoning all work on the home in February 2001, leaving the home incomplete and uninhabitable."

After a bench trial, the court held that TLD breached the contract and failed to cure the breach. As to damages the court held that it would be too costly to complete the home, so the unfinished home should be demolished. The court held that the Fontanas had been damaged in the amount of $1,271,816.10. The trial court entered judgement against TLD and DiCosloa jointly and severally.

The only relevant appeal from the judgment was that of DiCosola. Plaintiffs alleged that DiCosola was the alter ego of TLD and that, after the lawsuit was filed, he caused TLD to cease its business operations so that it had no funds with which to compensate plaintiffs. DiCosola was not a shareholder of TLD.

Theresa DiCosoloa was called as a witness by the Plaintiffs. Mrs. DiCosola admitted that she was the incorporater of TLD. She could provide no evidence that the corporation had any start-up capital. There was no evidence that she or DiCosola ever paid for the stock issued by the corporation. The purported owner of the corporation, Theresa DiCosola, knew nothing about the corporation, did not sign checks, kept no records and did not know whether the corporation had ever earned a profit or a loss.

Theresa "said that she has never received a dividend from TLD and did not know if TLD had profits or losses in the years, 1998,1999, 2000, 2001 and 2002. However, Theresa did sign TLD's income tax returns for those years." She also admitted that she had no idea where the company's assets of $1.8 million went after the lawsuit was filed.

The company had almost no financial records, and almost no records of payments that it made to vendors and subcontractors.

As a result, the trial court found that "Mr. DiCosola is the dominant force behind this corporation" and that the corporation "was little more than a shell which was established to shield him from liability."

In Illinois a party seeking to pierce the corporate veil has the burden of making a substantial showing that the corporation is really a dummy or sham for another person or corporation. In re Estate of Wallen, 262 Ill. App. 3d 61, 68 (1994). The doctrine "imposes liability on the individual or entity that uses a corporation merely as an instrumentality to conduct that person's or entity's business."

The court first rejected the argument that DiCosola could not be held liable because he was not a shareholder. There is authority in Illinois and other states that a non-shareholder can be held liable if the other elements of the test are met.

Illinois uses a two-step test to determine whether the veil should be pierced:

"(1) there must be such unity of interest and ownership that the separate personalities of the corporation and the individual no longer exist; and (2) circumstances must exist such that adherence to the fiction of a separate corporate existence would sanction a fraud, promote injustice, or promote inequitable consequences."

To determine whether the "unity of interest" test has been met courts examine many factors, including (1) inadequate capitalization; (2) failure to issue stock; (3) failure to observe corporate formalities; (4) nonpayment of dividends; (5) insolvency of the debtor corporation; (6) nonfunctioning of the other officers or directors; (7) absence of corporate records; (7) commingling of funds; (9) diversion of assets from the corporation by or to a stockholder or other person or entity to the detriment of creditors; (10) failure to maintain arm's length relationships amont related entities; and (11) whether, in fact the corporation is a mere facade fro the operation of the dominant stockholders." Jacobson v. Buffalo Rock Shooters Supply, Inc., 278 Ill. App. 3d 1084, 1088 (1996).

Obviously, the factors when analyzed strongly favored plaintiffs:

(1) no evidence of adequate capitalization; (2) failure to issue stock; (3) failure to observe corporate formalities; ... (5) insolvency; (6) no evidence that Theresa functioned as a real officer or director; (7) almost total absence of corporate records.

The Appellate Court affirmed the finding of piercing the veil.

Comment: this case involves a corporation and a shareholder who did almost everything wrong - no capital; no records; no consistent use of the corporate name; no effort to follow corporate formalities and evidence of commingling. The result - personal liability in excess of $1.2 million logically follows when one considers the underlying facts and the underlying transaction and the apparent effort to stiff the plaintiffs and deny them their legitimate recovery.

This case is a lesson to all entrepreneurs that it is not enough to form a corporation - you must use the corporation and treat it as a separate and independent person. You must use the corporate checking account or credit card and keep records of corporate expenses. You must keep your own affairs and accounts separate from those of the corporation. Finally, it is wrong to transfer funds to yourself or others to avoid paying your creditors.

A corporation should not be forgotten once established, but carefully maintained over time.

Edward X. Clinton, Jr.
Copyright 2010

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Mortgage Foreclosure - Bank Fails to Make Diligent Efforts To Serve Defendant - Default Judgment Reversed

CITIMORTGAGE, INC. v. Cotton, Ill: Appellate Court, 1st Dist., 2nd Div. 2012 - Google Scholar:

This is a mortgage foreclosure case in which Citimortgage was unable to serve the defendant and obtained service by publication.  On appeal, the court held that the bank failed to make diligent efforts to serve the defendant and the default judgment was reversed.

There are two standards that govern service - diligent inquiry and due inquiry.  The court explains the difference: "The plaintiff must conduct both "diligent inquiry" in ascertaining the defendant's residence and "due inquiry" in ascertaining the defendant's whereabouts before the plaintiff can properly execute an affidavit stating that the defendant cannot be found. Bell Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Horton, 59 Ill. App. 3d 923, 927-28, 376 N.E.2d 1029, 1033 (1978)."

Here, the bank failed to contact Cotton's attorney or attempt to reach Cotton at his job.  Thus, the bank may have failed to make "due inquiry."

After the judgment was entered, Cotton filed a motion for reconsideration, and a supporting affidavit, arguing that the bank's efforts to find him were lacking.

The case was remanded to the circuit court so that the court could conduct a hearing on what efforts the bank made.

Comment; the lesson here is that service by publication may be challenged.  Personal service is always the best idea.

Edward X. Clinton, Jr.

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Fraudulent Transfer - Appellate Court Upholds Judgment In Favor Of Creditor Against Wife Of Debtor

HARRIS NA v. Harris, Ill: Appellate Court, 1st Dist., 1st Div. 2012 - Google Scholar:

This is an appeal from a grant of summary judgment in favor of Harris Bank against Sheri Harris, the ex-wife of Stuart Levine.

The bank alleged that in 2002 Levine allegedly defaulted on a $3.3 million dollar note due to the Bank and to avoid collection had transferred assets to his wife for no consideration.  The asset transfers rendered Levine insolvent, so he was unable to pay Harris bank.

Ms. Harris argued that the bank's case was barred by a 2008 federal forfeiture judgment.  The trial court and the appellate court disagreed, holding instead that the forfeiture judgment only applied to two of Levine's assets, not the rest of the disputed property.

The court found that Ms. Harris forfeited two arguments (a) that there was adequate consideration for the transfers; and (b) that the property was marital property in which she had a 50% interest, because Ms. Harris failed to raise these issues before the trial court.  The court states: "Because neither this argument nor any evidence supporting it was presented to the circuit court, we deem the argument forfeited on appeal. See Cooney v. Magnabosco,407 Ill. App. 3d 264, 268, 943 N.E.2d 290 (2011) (stating that an appellant that fails to raise an issue in the circuit court waives that issue for purposes of appeal)."

In sum, a classic fraudulent transfer case.

Edward X. Clinton, Jr.

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